{ "module": "ROAT-MOD-LAYERS", "snapshot_date": "2026-08-25", "exported_from_hub": "2026-09-05T20:22:16.310Z", "source_sheet": "Cross-section 2026 – AV Normalisation", "rows": [ { "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-EU", "regime_label": "EU / UNECE baseline", "records": [ "ROAT-2026-0036", "ROAT-2026-0040", "ROAT-2026-0011", "ROAT-2026-0177", "ROAT-2026-0218", "ROAT-2026-0299", "ROAT-2026-0300" ], "rationale": "EU ADS type-approval rules are dedicated and UNECE technical harmonisation is advanced, while lawful operation, actors and infrastructure remain partly national and fragmented.", "confidence": "High", "panel": "current", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 2, "actor_allocation": 2, "liability_risk": 2, "behavioural_rules": 2, "infrastructure": 1, "international": 3, "range": 2, "asynchrony": "Significant", "family": "Technical + international harmonisation-leading configuration", "bridge": "Art 34bis agency/deeming; Art 39 equivalence/exemption; national operational law remains necessary", "sensitivity": "Road/actor/liability plausibly N1–N2; technical and international remain N3.", "robust_conclusion": "Technical/international-leading configuration survives all plausible ±1 recoding.", "caveat": "This is a supranational baseline, not a self-contained road-operation jurisdiction." }, { "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-UK", "regime_label": "Great Britain", "records": [ "ROAT-2026-0171", "ROAT-2026-0214", "ROAT-2026-0301", "ROAT-2026-0302" ], "rationale": "The 2024 Act creates dedicated responsible actors and authorisation architecture; 2026 APS permits enable passenger-service deployment while the full authorisation framework and final safety principles are still being implemented.", "confidence": "High", "panel": "current", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 2, "actor_allocation": 3, "liability_risk": 3, "behavioural_rules": 2, "infrastructure": 1, "international": 2, "range": 2, "asynchrony": "Significant", "family": "Actor / institutional-leading configuration with staged operational permitting", "bridge": "APS permit bridge before full 2027 AV Act implementation", "sensitivity": "Operation N2–N3; actor/liability N2–N3; international N1–N2.", "robust_conclusion": "Actor/institution-leading configuration survives plausible recoding; legal institutionalisation precedes routine general deployment.", "caveat": "General full-Act implementation is planned for 2027; APS is a targeted early route, not proof that all AV use is N3." }, { "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-HR", "regime_label": "Croatia", "records": [ "ROAT-2026-0262", "ROAT-2026-0303", "ROAT-2026-0304", "ROAT-2026-0305" ], "rationale": "Croatia combines EU technical approval with dedicated road-traffic rules, remote/intervention actors, owner enforcement duties and a mandatory service-level real-world validation procedure before public passenger transport.", "confidence": "High", "panel": "current", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 3, "actor_allocation": 3, "liability_risk": 2, "behavioural_rules": 3, "infrastructure": 2, "international": 2, "range": 1, "asynchrony": "Mild", "family": "Deployment-assurance configuration – service-test variant", "bridge": "Mandatory real-world service validation on a registered sample vehicle before passenger service", "sensitivity": "Liability N2–N3; infrastructure N1–N2; international N2–N3.", "robust_conclusion": "Deployment-assurance configuration remains robust under conservative recoding.", "caveat": "Civil liability and quantitative retesting/change-control rules remain less clear than traffic-offence and service-assurance rules." }, { "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-SK", "regime_label": "Slovakia", "records": [ "ROAT-2026-0070", "ROAT-2026-0155", "ROAT-2026-0156", "ROAT-2026-0159", "ROAT-2026-0306" ], "rationale": "EU technical approval can reach N3, but current Slovak law still relies mainly on § 49 conditional test operation for AV/FAV; dedicated general operator/control-centre/fully automated deployment rules are proposed in print 1329 but are not yet law.", "confidence": "Medium–High", "panel": "current", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 1, "actor_allocation": 1, "liability_risk": 1, "behavioural_rules": 1, "infrastructure": 1, "international": 2, "range": 2, "asynchrony": "Significant", "family": "Testing-permit / technical-leading configuration", "bridge": "§ 49 test-operation permit; narrower ADV operational regime", "sensitivity": "Road/actor/behaviour plausibly N1–N2 because of permits and the narrower automated-delivery-vehicle regime; technical stays N3.", "robust_conclusion": "Testing-permit / technical-leading configuration persists under plausible recoding and after the 1 September 2026 trial-focused amendment.", "caveat": "Snapshot is 25 August 2026. Print 1329 passed first reading but committee deadlines fall in September; Act 131/2026 is adopted but effective only from 1 September 2026." }, { "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-FR", "regime_label": "France", "records": [ "ROAT-2026-0176", "ROAT-2026-0307", "ROAT-2026-0308", "ROAT-2026-0036", "ROAT-2026-0011" ], "rationale": "France combines EU vehicle approval with a dedicated automated-road-transport-system regime requiring safety demonstration for the technical system and deployed route or zone, qualified independent assessment, remote-intervention qualifications, safety management and a formal service-organiser decision before operation.", "confidence": "High", "panel": "current", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 3, "actor_allocation": 3, "liability_risk": 2, "behavioural_rules": 3, "infrastructure": 2, "international": 2, "range": 1, "asynchrony": "Mild", "family": "Deployment-assurance configuration – system safety-case / organiser-decision variant", "bridge": "Prior safety demonstration + qualified-body opinions + organiser decision of mise en service", "sensitivity": "Liability N2-N3; infrastructure N1-N2; international N2-N3.", "robust_conclusion": "Deployment-assurance configuration remains robust, with a safety-case/organiser-decision gate rather than Croatia’s service-test gate.", "caveat": "Dedicated criminal responsibility is clear; civil-liability allocation is less comprehensively AV-specific and is therefore coded conservatively at N2." }, { "regime_label": "Slovakia from 1 Sept 2026 – Act 131/2026 only", "panel": "prospective", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 1, "actor_allocation": 1, "liability_risk": 1, "behavioural_rules": 1, "infrastructure": 1, "international": 2, "result": "UNCHANGED PATHWAY", "interpretation": "The amendment broadens/adjusts § 49 trial mechanics but does not itself create a general deployment/operator regime.", "records": [], "rationale": "The amendment broadens/adjusts § 49 trial mechanics but does not itself create a general deployment/operator regime.", "confidence": "", "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-SK:131-2026" }, { "regime_label": "Slovakia if print 1329 enacted substantially as proposed", "panel": "prospective", "technical_approval": 3, "road_access": 3, "actor_allocation": 3, "liability_risk": 2, "behavioural_rules": 3, "infrastructure": 1, "international": 2, "result": "PATHWAY SHIFT", "interpretation": "Would move Slovakia from test-permit accommodation toward dedicated institutionalisation, while infrastructure and cross-border operational recognition would remain less mature.", "records": [], "rationale": "Would move Slovakia from test-permit accommodation toward dedicated institutionalisation, while infrastructure and cross-border operational recognition would remain less mature.", "confidence": "", "regime_id": "ROAT-JUR-SK:1329" } ], "pathways": [ { "pathway": "Technical / harmonisation-first", "pattern": "Technical and/or international layers are at least one stage ahead of operational/actor layers.", "case": "EU/UNECE; Slovakia (stronger national variant)", "value": "Shows why type approval cannot be treated as equivalent to lawful deployment." }, { "pathway": "Actor / institutional-first", "pattern": "Dedicated responsible actors and liability/authorisation architecture precede full ordinary operational implementation.", "case": "Great Britain", "value": "Falsifies one-directional pacing accounts: law can lead deployment." }, { "pathway": "Deployment-assurance family", "pattern": "Vehicle technical approval is followed by a separate service or system-level safety gate before ordinary operation.", "case": "Croatia - real-world service-test gate; France - safety-case + qualified assessment + organiser mise-en-service decision", "value": "Portability result: the pathway repeats across jurisdictions even though the bridging mechanism differs." }, { "pathway": "Testing-permit pathway", "pattern": "Public-road access remains predominantly experimental/conditional despite advanced technical standards.", "case": "Slovakia", "value": "Illustrates persistent inter-layer mismatch and dependence on legal bridges." } ], "findings": { "Cross-sectional finding": "The five 2026 regimes do not line up on one common ladder. They display different layer configurations and different leading layers. France strengthens the model because it replicates the deployment-assurance family through a different legal mechanism than Croatia.", "Novelty implication": "The strongest defensible contribution is a vector/pathway model: jurisdiction-specific configurations of functional-layer states produce recurring pathway families, while legal bridges or gates differ in doctrinal form.", "Next empirical step": "A true inter-coder reliability test requires a second human coder. The present same-model rule-based second pass is sufficient as a sensitivity audit, so theoretical drafting can now proceed." }, "audit": [ { "cell": "EU/UNECE - liability/risk", "first": "N2", "rule": "Require dedicated AV-specific liability institutionalisation for N2+", "second": "N1", "change": "-1", "effect": "None - technical/international lead becomes stronger" }, { "cell": "Great Britain - international/cross-border", "first": "N2", "rule": "Require dedicated reciprocal operational recognition, not only participation in UNECE technical instruments", "second": "N1", "change": "-1", "effect": "None - actor/institution-first pathway unchanged" }, { "cell": "Croatia - liability/risk", "first": "N2", "rule": "Dedicated traffic-offence and owner responsibility is insufficient for N3 without mature AV-specific civil-liability allocation", "second": "N2", "change": "0", "effect": "None" }, { "cell": "Slovakia - actor allocation", "first": "N1", "rule": "Draft operator and control-centre roles are excluded; narrower ADV and trial roles do not establish general FAV institutionalisation", "second": "N1", "change": "0", "effect": "None" }, { "cell": "France - liability/risk", "first": "N2", "rule": "Dedicated criminal responsibility exists, but N3 requires a broader stable AV-specific liability and risk architecture", "second": "N2", "change": "0", "effect": "None" }, { "cell": "France - infrastructure", "first": "N2", "rule": "Route and zone infrastructure is integrated into the safety case, but infrastructure is not yet routinised as an ordinary AV-wide layer", "second": "N2", "change": "0", "effect": "None" }, { "cell": "Audit result", "first": "2 of 6 audited cells moved by one stage under stricter rules; no jurisdiction changed pathway family.", "rule": "This is a robustness or sensitivity check only. It is not inter-coder reliability and should not be reported as such.", "second": "", "change": "", "effect": "" } ], "audit_result": [ "2 of 6 audited cells moved by one stage under stricter rules; no jurisdiction changed pathway family.", "This is a robustness or sensitivity check only. It is not inter-coder reliability and should not be reported as such." ], "purpose": [ "Cross-sectional Validation – Regulatory Normalisation of Automated Vehicles (snapshot: 25 August 2026)", "Purpose: test whether the N0–N4 functional-layer model discriminates among contemporary regimes at the same point in time. Scores measure legal embedding, not regulatory intensity. Draft law is excluded from current-law scores and shown separately as sensitivity/prospective evidence." ] }