Modules › Second Gate › 2026-09-07

Module 02 · ROAT-MOD-SECOND-GATE

Post-type-approval deployment models review snapshot

Name: Post-type-approval deployment models — snapshot 2026-09-07
Creator: Jozef Andraško
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

How do national legal orders convert the technical admissibility of a vehicle or ADS into a legal authorisation for real driverless deployment, and which functions does post-type-approval deployment governance perform?

Snapshot 2026-09-07 (frozen)Rows 8Coder JADOI 10.5281/zenodo.22546848Source dataset Post-Type-Approval Deployment Modelsdata.csv · data.jsonChanges since 2026-08-31 20

Type approval answers whether a vehicle and its automated driving system are technically admissible. It does not answer whether the vehicle may lawfully operate without a driver on a given road, for a given service, under a given actor. The Second Gate model codes what stands between the two — the deployment gate, its object, its decision maker, the accountable actor, remote roles, and the lifecycle rules that keep the authorisation honest when the system changes.

Regimes marked as draft or prospective are analytically important but are never coded as current law.

Functional coding of eight regimes across eighteen dimensions: regulatory object, technical baseline, deployment gate, ODD legalisation, authority, accountable actor, remote human role, DDT allocation, offence allocation, liability, data, in-use oversight, material change, revalidation, service pathway, dominant model, legal status. Current law and draft or prospective regimes are kept apart.

The table

Coded rows

Select a row for every coded dimension, the rationale and the ROAT records behind it.

Regime	Deployment gate	Remote human role	Dominant deployment model	Legal status	Confidence
Current law · snapshot 2026-09-07
Germany – current law	Vehicle operating permit + authority approval of defined operating area + registration before autonomous road use	Technische Aufsicht – may deactivate and release specified manoeuvres; not ordinary continuous remote driving	Operating-area + technical-supervision model	In force	High
Germany – current law Regulatory object Autonomous vehicle + approved defined operating area + keeper + technical supervision Technical approval baseline EU/UNECE technical baseline plus German autonomous-vehicle operating permit under StVG/AFGBV Additional deployment / road-use gate Vehicle operating permit + authority approval of defined operating area + registration before autonomous road use ODD / operating-area legalisation ODD is translated into a geographically defined and authority-approved 'festgelegter Betriebsbereich' Competent authority / decision maker KBA / competent road authority depending on decision layer Primary accountable organisational actor Halter (vehicle keeper), with manufacturer duties and Technische Aufsicht functions separately allocated Remote human role Technische Aufsicht – may deactivate and release specified manoeuvres; not ordinary continuous remote driving DDT / fallback allocation ADS performs DDT; system must comply with road rules and achieve minimum-risk condition where necessary Traffic-offence allocation Dedicated AV behavioural architecture; legal duties are distributed among ADS framework, keeper and supervisor rather than simply retained by an onboard driver Civil liability / insurance General StVG keeper-liability / insurance architecture remains central; not wholly replaced by AV-specific civil liability Data / logging Statutory event/data duties; AFGBV data-storage requirements Post-market / in-use oversight KBA/authority market surveillance and permit supervision Material change / software update AFGBV § 4(5) expressly requires KBA approval before post-permit changes to an autonomous vehicle are used; § 6 allows withdrawal/suspension of the vehicle operating permit where approval conditions cease to be met. Retesting / revalidation Explicit lifecycle control: KBA approval for vehicle changes; suspension/withdrawal pending clarification under § 6; operating-area approval can be suspended/withdrawn under § 10 when safety assumptions or infrastructure conditions cease to hold. Commercial service pathway Possible within approved operating area and applicable transport/service law Dominant deployment model Operating-area + technical-supervision model Legal status In force Primary-source anchor StVG §§ 1d–1g; AFGBV §§ 4, 7–11, 13–14 Primary current-law rationale Germany most clearly converts a technical ODD into a public-law deployment object: lawful autonomous operation is geographically bounded by an approved operating area. Confidence High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0329 ROAT-2026-0330 ROAT-2026-0170 ROAT-2026-0205
France – current law	Prior system safety demonstration + qualified independent opinions + formal mise-en-service decision	Qualified remote intervention personnel integrated into system operation	System/service safety-assurance model	In force	High
France – current law Regulatory object Automated road transport system: vehicle + technical system + route/zone + service organisation Technical approval baseline EU type approval / relevant vehicle technical approval Additional deployment / road-use gate Prior system safety demonstration + qualified independent opinions + formal mise-en-service decision ODD / operating-area legalisation Safety case is tied to intended route or zone and service configuration Competent authority / decision maker Service organiser / competent transport and road authorities within statutory framework Primary accountable organisational actor Automated transport-system/service operator architecture rather than vehicle owner alone Remote human role Qualified remote intervention personnel integrated into system operation DDT / fallback allocation ADS performs DDT; remote intervention supports defined situations without collapsing into ordinary remote driving Traffic-offence allocation Dedicated criminal-responsibility adaptations exist; detailed allocation depends on operating mode and legal actor Civil liability / insurance Compulsory insurance/general civil-liability rules supplemented by dedicated automated-driving responsibility provisions; civil layer less comprehensive than deployment layer Data / logging System/event recording and safety-management evidence required Post-market / in-use oversight In-use system safety management and authority oversight tied to service operation Material change / software update Code des transports R3151-1 defines a substantial modification as one that changes the safety assessment; R3152-18 requires notification and, for a substantially modified system, suspension of operation. Retesting / revalidation Explicit re-commissioning: after a substantial modification the organiser suspends operation and a new mise-en-service decision is taken under R3152-10 to R3152-12; R3152-11 applies to new or substantially modified systems. Commercial service pathway Yes. Passenger automated-road-transport-system pathway extended to automated road freight by Décret 2024-1063, effective 28 Nov 2024. Dominant deployment model System/service safety-assurance model Legal status In force Primary-source anchor Ordonnance 2021-443; Décret 2021-873; Code des transports R3151/R3152; Décret 2024-1063 / R3251–R3253 Primary current-law rationale France regulates the socio-technical transport system, not merely the vehicle. Technical approval is necessary but not sufficient for service deployment. Confidence High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0307 ROAT-2026-0308 ROAT-2026-0336
Croatia – current law	Dedicated road-traffic rules plus mandatory real-world service validation before passenger-service deployment	Remote intervention role recognised; boundaries and concurrency remain implementation questions	Owner-centred deployment-validation model	In force	High
Croatia – current law Regulatory object Fully automated vehicle + owner + operating area + transport service + remote intervention arrangements Technical approval baseline EU ADS type approval Additional deployment / road-use gate Dedicated road-traffic rules plus mandatory real-world service validation before passenger-service deployment ODD / operating-area legalisation Operating area / territory forms part of deployment validation and service conditions Competent authority / decision maker Transport/road authorities; licensing authority under national transport framework Primary accountable organisational actor Vehicle owner is a central road-traffic accountability actor; service operator duties exist at transport layer Remote human role Remote intervention role recognised; boundaries and concurrency remain implementation questions DDT / fallback allocation ADS performs driverless operation; remote intervention supports defined operational/safety functions Traffic-offence allocation Owner bears dedicated responsibility for traffic offences of fully automated vehicle in driverless operation Civil liability / insurance Traffic-offence allocation is clear; broader AV-specific civil-liability architecture is less complete Data / logging Strong telemetry/event-data access and video-surveillance duties Post-market / in-use oversight Service/deployment oversight, incident management and licence conditions Material change / software update Partial change-control only: a new special-conditions certificate is required within 15 days if certificate data change; general testing applies to converted/modified vehicle hardware under Road Safety Act Art 276. Retesting / revalidation No equally explicit rule located that a material ADS/ODD/software/service change automatically re-triggers the Art 13b–13d real-world service-validation procedure. Serious incidents can trigger temporary prohibition of a FAV type under Art 290a. Commercial service pathway Yes, through transport licensing after service-level real-world validation Dominant deployment model Owner-centred deployment-validation model Legal status In force Primary-source anchor NN 145/2024 Arts 281a–281f; NN 154/2024 Arts 13b–13d / Art 51a framework Primary current-law rationale Croatia is especially useful for the bridge from EU type approval to local service validation in real operating conditions. Confidence High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0262ROAT-2026-0303 ROAT-2026-0304 ROAT-2026-0305
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law	Automated Passenger Service permit under Part 5 of the AV Act 2024 (in force 15 May 2026) for eligible passenger services; other deployments run as pilots under vehicle special orders; Part 1 authorisation not yet commenced at snapshot	No German-style technical supervisor as universal core role; remote functions depend on operating model	Staged-permit model (APS permits and pilots ahead of Part 1 authorisation)	Partly in force: Part 5 (APS permits) from 15 May 2026; Part 1 authorisation and Part 4 marketing restrictions commence in 2027	High
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law Regulatory object APS permit holder and pilot-operator architecture as the 2026 transitional route; authorised self-driving vehicle / responsible-entity architecture enacted but not yet commenced Technical approval baseline UK vehicle approval/self-driving authorisation architecture under AV Act implementation programme Additional deployment / road-use gate Automated Passenger Service permit under Part 5 of the AV Act 2024 (in force 15 May 2026) for eligible passenger services; other deployments run as pilots under vehicle special orders; Part 1 authorisation not yet commenced at snapshot ODD / operating-area legalisation Deployment area fixed through APS permit and pilot conditions; authorised domain under Part 1 of the AV Act not yet in force Competent authority / decision maker Secretary of State / DVSA and relevant local transport authority for APS consent Primary accountable organisational actor APS permit holder / pilot operator; ASDE and NUiC-operator architecture in Part 1 of the AV Act not yet in force Remote human role No German-style technical supervisor as universal core role; remote functions depend on operating model DDT / fallback allocation Authorised ADS performs self-driving task; user-in-charge duties are separated where relevant Traffic-offence allocation No general rule in force at snapshot: Part 1 reallocation of legal responsibility away from the user not yet commenced; pilot and permit conditions require reporting of infractions Civil liability / insurance Dedicated: Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 s. 2 makes the insurer liable for accidents caused by a listed automated vehicle driving itself; AV Act 2024 insurance and liability provisions pending Data / logging Reporting under APS permit conditions and pilot conditions (collisions, infractions); information duties of Part 1 of the AV Act not yet in force Post-market / in-use oversight Oversight through APS permit monitoring and pilot conditions; in-use regulation under Part 1 planned for full implementation Material change / software update APS Regulations 2026 treat a material change in circumstances as a ground for permit variation, suspension or withdrawal; AV Act ss 5, 8 and 9 authorisation powers not yet commenced Retesting / revalidation Permit-level: variation, suspension or withdrawal of an APS permit or pilot on breach or incident; general authorisation lifecycle under Part 1 remains implementation-stage through 2027 Commercial service pathway APS permit enables staged commercial passenger deployment in 2026 Dominant deployment model Staged-permit model (APS permits and pilots ahead of Part 1 authorisation) Legal status Partly in force: Part 5 (APS permits) from 15 May 2026; Part 1 authorisation and Part 4 marketing restrictions commence in 2027 Primary-source anchor Automated Vehicles Act 2024 and Commencement No. 1–3 Regulations (SI 2025/1339, 2026/437, 2026/731); SI 2026/439; AEVA 2018 s. 2; DfT implementation programme Primary current-law rationale UK is a control case showing that actor/institution design can legally precede full ordinary deployment. Confidence High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0171 ROAT-2026-0214 ROAT-2026-0301 ROAT-2026-0302
China – current transitional regime	Product admission is followed by geographically/functionally limited road-access pilot rather than unrestricted deployment	No mature national standalone technical-supervisor/remote-operator role architecture yet	Manufacturer/user-entity conditional deployment model	In force as pilot / conditional admission architecture	High
China – current transitional regime Regulatory object Conditionally admitted L3 vehicle + designated user entity + specified roads/speeds + road-access pilot Technical approval baseline Conditional product admission; GB 44721-2026 adopted but effective from 1 July 2027 Additional deployment / road-use gate Product admission is followed by geographically/functionally limited road-access pilot rather than unrestricted deployment ODD / operating-area legalisation Specified road segments, speed limits and operating conditions function as legally bounded ODD/geofence Competent authority / decision maker MIIT and participating local authorities under pilot framework Primary accountable organisational actor Designated user entity + manufacturer within monitored pilot architecture Remote human role No mature national standalone technical-supervisor/remote-operator role architecture yet DDT / fallback allocation L3 ADS performs DDT within approved conditions; human fallback remains relevant to L3 design Traffic-offence allocation Current pilot arrangements do not yet equal the proposed national manufacturer-centric offence rule Civil liability / insurance Existing compulsory insurance/general rules apply; national AV-specific insurance provisions are proposed, not yet enacted Data / logging Pilot monitoring and safety evidence required Post-market / in-use oversight Government monitoring and conditional product/road-access controls Material change / software update Pilot/product approval is version- and condition-sensitive; exact general change-control rule is still evolving Retesting / revalidation Road-access pilots and reassessment provide staged evidence before expansion Commercial service pathway Limited pilot deployment; not unrestricted nationwide commercial L3 operation Dominant deployment model Manufacturer/user-entity conditional deployment model Legal status In force as pilot / conditional admission architecture Primary-source anchor MIIT conditional L3 approvals of 15 Dec 2025; GB 44721-2026 Primary current-law rationale China already demonstrates the second-gate logic in practice even before the new national Road Traffic Safety Law is enacted. Confidence High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0327 ROAT-2026-0328
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026)	Predominantly § 49 test-operation permit; the only non-test deployment gate is the operational permit for automated delivery vehicles under § 52 of Act 106/2018; no general dedicated commercial FAV deployment gate	No general commercial FAV technical-supervision/control-centre role in force; supervising driver (dohliadajúci vodič) with remote takeover for automated delivery vehicles (Act 8/2009 § 2(2)(w), § 5(6))	Testing-permit / technical-leading model	In force	Medium–High
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) Regulatory object EU-approved vehicle + national test-operation / narrower operational exceptions Technical approval baseline EU/UNECE type-approval framework can provide high technical maturity Additional deployment / road-use gate Predominantly § 49 test-operation permit; the only non-test deployment gate is the operational permit for automated delivery vehicles under § 52 of Act 106/2018; no general dedicated commercial FAV deployment gate ODD / operating-area legalisation ODD reflected in permit/test conditions; for automated delivery vehicles the operational permit fixes territory, route and time (§ 52(6)); not yet a general autonomous-operation authorisation object Competent authority / decision maker Ministry of Transport / road and police authorities depending on permit Primary accountable organisational actor Permit holder / owner / driver-type roles; operator holding an operational permit for automated delivery vehicles (§ 52); no general licensed FAV operator architecture in force Remote human role No general commercial FAV technical-supervision/control-centre role in force; supervising driver (dohliadajúci vodič) with remote takeover for automated delivery vehicles (Act 8/2009 § 2(2)(w), § 5(6)) DDT / fallback allocation Current framework remains structurally driver/test oriented; dedicated driverless DDT allocation is incomplete Traffic-offence allocation No complete general rule for traffic offences committed by driverless FAV Civil liability / insurance General motor insurance/civil liability; no mature FAV-specific allocation Data / logging Test-operation documentation and technical rules; supervision log and permit-conditioned operational data for automated delivery vehicles (Act 8/2009 § 6(7); Act 106/2018 § 52(6)–(7)); no general FAV logging architecture equivalent to CPT 1329 Post-market / in-use oversight Primarily permit/test supervision rather than mature in-use driverless market oversight Material change / software update Handled through technical approval/test permit changes; no general deployment change-control regime Retesting / revalidation Retesting tied mainly to test-operation context Commercial service pathway No general pathway from EU type approval to ordinary commercial driverless operation; goods delivery by automated delivery vehicles is the only permitted service use (Act 8/2009 § 55b; Act 106/2018 § 52) Dominant deployment model Testing-permit / technical-leading model Legal status In force Primary-source anchor Act 106/2018 §§ 49, 52; Act 8/2009 §§ 2, 5, 6, 55b; Decree 131/2018; Act 131/2026 effective 1 Sep 2026 only prospectively at snapshot Primary current-law rationale The central inter-layer gap remains: technical admissibility does not yet map onto a general legal route for commercial driverless deployment. Confidence Medium–High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0155 ROAT-2026-0156 ROAT-2026-0306 ROAT-2026-0159
Sensitivity · prospective law (not current-law scores)
China – 2026 Road Traffic Safety Law draft	Registered AV may activate ADS only within design operating conditions; national road-use rules sit above technical conformity	Remote human role remains underdeveloped in the draft	Manufacturer-centred road-use and enforcement model	Draft / public consultation	High
China – 2026 Road Traffic Safety Law draft prospective Regulatory object Autonomous vehicle/ADS + manufacturer/importer + road-use accountability layer Technical approval baseline Road-traffic-rule conformity test + technical/product admission; GB 44721-2026 technical pillar Additional deployment / road-use gate Registered AV may activate ADS only within design operating conditions; national road-use rules sit above technical conformity ODD / operating-area legalisation Manufacturer/importer must ensure ADS cannot activate outside design operating conditions Competent authority / decision maker Public-security / product / transport authorities under State Council allocation Primary accountable organisational actor Manufacturer/importer becomes direct central accountability actor for ADS-active traffic violations Remote human role Remote human role remains underdeveloped in the draft DDT / fallback allocation ADS continuously performs full DDT within design operating conditions; L2 assistance is expressly distinguished Traffic-offence allocation Manufacturer/importer 'accepts handling' for violation while ADS active and bears burden of proof if claiming it was unrelated to ADS Civil liability / insurance Compulsory motor-vehicle liability insurance required; commercial insurance encouraged; detailed regime delegated Data / logging Strong accident evidence/data duties and manufacturer data-provision obligations Post-market / in-use oversight National road-safety risk assessment can support suspension/prohibition, recall, repair, replacement/refund/compensation measures Material change / software update Unauthorised ADS modification prohibited and sanctioned; post-market risk layer is explicit Retesting / revalidation Implementing rules still required; change/revalidation mechanics not fully specified Commercial service pathway Supports ordinary national road operation once enacted and implementing rules exist Dominant deployment model Manufacturer-centred road-use and enforcement model Legal status Draft / public consultation Primary-source anchor Road Traffic Safety Law revision draft Arts 95–103 Primary current-law rationale Analytically important but must not be coded as current Chinese law. It adds a national road-use layer to the already emerging technical and pilot layers. Confidence High Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0326 ROAT-2026-0327 ROAT-2026-0328
Slovakia – CPT 1329 prospective model	Operator licence + specific operation approval would create a genuine second gate	Supervision operator + control centre; current draft boundary with remote driving needs correction	Licensed-operator + control-centre deployment model	Draft / parliamentary print 1329	High for text; prospective only
Slovakia – CPT 1329 prospective model prospective Regulatory object Licensed FAV operator + approved operation + control centre + supervision operator + ODD Technical approval baseline EU/UNECE technical approval remains baseline Additional deployment / road-use gate Operator licence + specific operation approval would create a genuine second gate ODD / operating-area legalisation ODD and defined roads/territory become part of operational documentation / approval Competent authority / decision maker Ministry of Transport with police/other authority inputs Primary accountable organisational actor Licensed FAV operator becomes organisational centre of responsibility Remote human role Supervision operator + control centre; current draft boundary with remote driving needs correction DDT / fallback allocation ADS should remain DDT performer; current wording risks transferring DDT remotely to supervisor in some clauses Traffic-offence allocation Still requires explicit rule for offences committed by FAV while ADS is active Civil liability / insurance Insurance/organisational requirements improve, but full civil/product/service allocation remains to be clarified Data / logging Dedicated recording system proposed Post-market / in-use oversight Operator/licence supervision and operational duties create stronger in-use layer Material change / software update Draft requires clearer material-change / software-version triggers Retesting / revalidation Local validation/testing is structurally present but should be proportionate and recognise existing type-approval/foreign evidence Commercial service pathway Potential general commercial pathway if enacted and separated from test-only logic Dominant deployment model Licensed-operator + control-centre deployment model Legal status Draft / parliamentary print 1329 Primary-source anchor CPT 1329 §§ 49a–49f and related amendments Primary current-law rationale The draft is conceptually close to a mature second-gate architecture, but actor boundaries, offence allocation, material-change control and the relation between licence and operation approval should be tightened. Confidence High for text; prospective only Core ROAT records ROAT-2026-0159 ROAT-2026-0040 ROAT-2026-0311 ROAT-2026-0326 ROAT-2026-0329 ROAT-2026-0330

What changed

Since snapshot 2026-08-31

20 cells in 2 rows differ from the superseded snapshot. Every difference is a deliberate recoding; the reason is recorded in the second-pass statement and the caveats below.

Row	Dimension	Before (2026-08-31)	After (2026-09-07)
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Regulatory object	Authorised self-driving vehicle / responsible entity architecture; APS service permits as transitional deployment route	APS permit holder and pilot-operator architecture as the 2026 transitional route; authorised self-driving vehicle / responsible-entity architecture enacted but not yet commenced
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Additional deployment / road-use gate	Automated Passenger Service permit for eligible passenger services before full 2027 implementation; wider general authorisation framework still being completed	Automated Passenger Service permit under Part 5 of the AV Act 2024 (in force 15 May 2026) for eligible passenger services; other deployments run as pilots under vehicle special orders; Part 1 authorisation not yet commenced at snapshot
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	ODD / operating-area legalisation	Authorised domain / territory forms part of self-driving authorisation and safety principles	Deployment area fixed through APS permit and pilot conditions; authorised domain under Part 1 of the AV Act not yet in force
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Primary accountable organisational actor	ASDE / licensed service operator / NUiC-type actor architecture depending on service and vehicle use	APS permit holder / pilot operator; ASDE and NUiC-operator architecture in Part 1 of the AV Act not yet in force
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Traffic-offence allocation	AV Act reallocates legal responsibility away from user where vehicle is driving itself, subject to statutory architecture	No general rule in force at snapshot: Part 1 reallocation of legal responsibility away from the user not yet commenced; pilot and permit conditions require reporting of infractions
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Civil liability / insurance	Dedicated insurance/liability reforms are part of UK AV framework	Dedicated: Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 s. 2 makes the insurer liable for accidents caused by a listed automated vehicle driving itself; AV Act 2024 insurance and liability provisions pending
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Data / logging	Information, incident and in-use regulatory duties form part of full Act architecture	Reporting under APS permit conditions and pilot conditions (collisions, infractions); information duties of Part 1 of the AV Act not yet in force
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Post-market / in-use oversight	In-use regulation and safety-principles monitoring planned as core of full implementation	Oversight through APS permit monitoring and pilot conditions; in-use regulation under Part 1 planned for full implementation
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Material change / software update	AV Act 2024 ss 5, 8 and 9 provide ongoing authorisation requirements and powers to vary, suspend or withdraw authorisation; conditions may be tailored to features/deployment locations. APS Regulations 2026 additionally treat a material change in circumstances as a ground for permit variation/suspension/withdrawal.	APS Regulations 2026 treat a material change in circumstances as a ground for permit variation, suspension or withdrawal; AV Act ss 5, 8 and 9 authorisation powers not yet commenced
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Retesting / revalidation	Strong lifecycle authorisation logic: permanent or temporary variation, suspension and withdrawal; serious incidents, failure of requirements or material changed circumstances can trigger intervention. Full general AV authorisation framework remains implementation-stage through 2027.	Permit-level: variation, suspension or withdrawal of an APS permit or pilot on breach or incident; general authorisation lifecycle under Part 1 remains implementation-stage through 2027
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Dominant deployment model	Authorised-entity / staged-permit model	Staged-permit model (APS permits and pilots ahead of Part 1 authorisation)
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Legal status	Partly in force; full AV Act framework planned for 2027	Partly in force: Part 5 (APS permits) from 15 May 2026; Part 1 authorisation and Part 4 marketing restrictions commence in 2027
Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law ROAT-JUR-UK	Primary-source anchor	Automated Vehicles Act 2024; SI 2026/439; DfT implementation programme	Automated Vehicles Act 2024 and Commencement No. 1–3 Regulations (SI 2025/1339, 2026/437, 2026/731); SI 2026/439; AEVA 2018 s. 2; DfT implementation programme
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	Additional deployment / road-use gate	Predominantly § 49 test-operation permit; no general dedicated commercial FAV deployment gate	Predominantly § 49 test-operation permit; the only non-test deployment gate is the operational permit for automated delivery vehicles under § 52 of Act 106/2018; no general dedicated commercial FAV deployment gate
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	ODD / operating-area legalisation	ODD can be reflected in permit/test conditions but is not yet a general autonomous-operation authorisation object	ODD reflected in permit/test conditions; for automated delivery vehicles the operational permit fixes territory, route and time (§ 52(6)); not yet a general autonomous-operation authorisation object
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	Primary accountable organisational actor	Permit holder / owner / driver-type roles; no general licensed FAV operator architecture in force	Permit holder / owner / driver-type roles; operator holding an operational permit for automated delivery vehicles (§ 52); no general licensed FAV operator architecture in force
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	Remote human role	No general commercial FAV technical-supervision/control-centre role in force	No general commercial FAV technical-supervision/control-centre role in force; supervising driver (dohliadajúci vodič) with remote takeover for automated delivery vehicles (Act 8/2009 § 2(2)(w), § 5(6))
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	Data / logging	Test-operation documentation and technical rules, but no general FAV logging architecture equivalent to CPT 1329	Test-operation documentation and technical rules; supervision log and permit-conditioned operational data for automated delivery vehicles (Act 8/2009 § 6(7); Act 106/2018 § 52(6)–(7)); no general FAV logging architecture equivalent to CPT 1329
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	Commercial service pathway	No clear general pathway from EU type approval to ordinary commercial driverless operation	No general pathway from EU type approval to ordinary commercial driverless operation; goods delivery by automated delivery vehicles is the only permitted service use (Act 8/2009 § 55b; Act 106/2018 § 52)
Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026) ROAT-JUR-SK	Primary-source anchor	Act 106/2018 § 49; Decree 131/2018; Act 131/2026 effective 1 Sep 2026 only prospectively at snapshot	Act 106/2018 §§ 49, 52; Act 8/2009 §§ 2, 5, 6, 55b; Decree 131/2018; Act 131/2026 effective 1 Sep 2026 only prospectively at snapshot

Snapshot record

Provenance

Snapshot

ROAT-SNAP-SECOND-GATE-2026-09-07 · legal snapshot date 2026-09-07 · data exported 2026-09-06

Coder · second pass

JA · Machine-assisted blind second pass (ChatGPT, 2026-09-06) on 7 of 8 regimes; the text of the China Road Traffic Safety Law revision draft was not accessible to the second coder. Class-level agreement 61 % on the coded regimes after mapping the first pass to a 14-dimension codebook; 28 substantive disagreements adjudicated by JA, 20 cells changed against the 2026-08-31 snapshot: Great Britain (13 cells) is now coded on what was in force on 31 August 2026 (Part 5 of the Automated Vehicles Act 2024 and APS permits from 15 May 2026, AEVA 2018 s. 2 insurer liability, pilots), not on the Part 1 authorisation architecture that commences later; Slovakia (7 cells) records the operational permit for automated delivery vehicles under § 52 of Act No. 106/2018 Coll. as the only non-test deployment gate. Not inter-coder reliability.

Caveats

Current law and draft/prospective regimes are kept apart; China RTSL draft and Slovak print 1329 are prospective only.
Great Britain is coded as 2026 transitional current law: Part 5 of the Automated Vehicles Act 2024 (automated passenger service permits) has been in force since 15 May 2026, Part 1 (authorisation, authorised self-driving entities, no-user-in-charge operators, reallocation of legal responsibility) had not been commenced at the snapshot date, and Part 4 commences on 7 January 2027 (Commencement Regulations SI 2025/1339, 2026/437 and 2026/731).
Slovakia: the operational permit for automated delivery vehicles (§ 52 of Act No. 106/2018 Coll., with § 55b, § 2(2)(w) and § 5(6) of Act No. 8/2009 Coll.) is a narrow but real deployment gate outside test operation; the general assessment that no deployment gate exists for fully automated vehicles stands.
17 first-pass cells affirm a feature for which the second coder found no passage in the listed sources; they stand on the first coder's reading and are queued for pinpointing at the next revision.
The China RTSL draft row was not second-coded; it will be re-coded when the draft text is supplied to the second coder.

Concepts

DDT fallback and minimal risk condition (DDT / fallback allocation); Deployment gate (the second gate) (Additional deployment / road-use gate); Dynamic driving task (DDT) (DDT / fallback allocation); Operational design domain (ODD) (ODD / operating-area legalisation); Remote assistance (Remote human role); Remote driving (Remote human role); Remote intervention (Remote human role); Technical supervision (remote supervisor) (Remote human role)

All snapshots

2026-08-31 (superseded) · 2026-09-07

Supersedes

ROAT-SNAP-SECOND-GATE-2026-08-31 · 20 cells recoded

Sources cited in this snapshot

ROAT-2026-0040

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1426 on type-approval of automated driving systems

ROAT-2026-0155

Act No. 8/2009 Coll. on Road Traffic (Zákon č. 8/2009 Z. z. o cestnej premávke)

ROAT-2026-0156

Act No. 106/2018 Coll. on the Operation of Vehicles in Road Traffic (Zákon č. 106/2018 Z. z.)

ROAT-2026-0159

Government Bill amending laws in connection with expanding the framework for introducing and using automated vehicles in the Slovak Republic (Parliamentary Print 1329)

ROAT-2026-0170

German Road Traffic Act (StVG) § 1a – Motor vehicles with an automated driving function (Straßenverkehrsgesetz § 1a)

ROAT-2026-0171

Automated Vehicles Act 2024

ROAT-2026-0205

Technical Report of the Working Group “Research Needs in Teleoperation” (BASt F 166b)

ROAT-2026-0214

Automated vehicles: statement of safety principles consultation

ROAT-2026-0262

Report · Analysed · Level 4 - Conference or institutional source — not yet in the public Source Library

ROAT-2026-0301

The Automated Vehicles (Permits for Automated Passenger Services) Regulations 2026

ROAT-2026-0302

Automated Vehicles Act implementation programme

ROAT-2026-0303

Act amending the Road Traffic Safety Act, NN 145/2024 (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o sigurnosti prometa na cestama)

ROAT-2026-0304

Ordinance amending the Ordinance on special conditions for vehicles used in public road transport and own-account transport, NN 154/2024 (Pravilnik o izmjenama i dopunama Pravilnika o posebnim uvjetima za vozila kojima se obavlja javni cestovni prijevoz i prijevoz za vlastite potrebe)

ROAT-2026-0305

Act amending the Road Transport Act, NN 77/2026 (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o prijevozu u cestovnom prometu)

ROAT-2026-0306

Act No. 131/2026 Coll. amending the Slovak Road Traffic Act and related legislation (Zákon č. 131/2026 Z. z.)

ROAT-2026-0307

Ordonnance No. 2021-443 of 14 April 2021 on criminal liability and conditions of use for vehicles with delegated driving (Ordonnance n° 2021-443)

ROAT-2026-0308

Decree No. 2021-873 of 29 June 2021 implementing Ordonnance No. 2021-443 (Décret n° 2021-873)

ROAT-2026-0311

Interpretation of EU Regulation 2022/1426 on the Type Approval of Automated Driving Systems: Addendum for Safety Management System and Remote Management

ROAT-2026-0326

Road Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China – revision draft (中华人民共和国道路交通安全法（修订草案）)

ROAT-2026-0327

GB 44721-2026 – Safety Requirements for Autonomous Driving Systems

ROAT-2026-0328

MIIT conditional approval of the first two Level 3 automated-driving vehicle models (工业和信息化部许可两款L3级自动驾驶车型产品)

ROAT-2026-0329

German Road Traffic Act (StVG) §§ 1d–1g – Motor vehicles with autonomous driving function in defined operating areas (Straßenverkehrsgesetz §§ 1d–1g)

ROAT-2026-0330

Ordinance on the approval and operation of motor vehicles with autonomous driving function in defined operating areas, AFGBV (Verordnung zur Genehmigung und zum Betrieb von Kraftfahrzeugen mit autonomer Fahrfunktion in festgelegten Betriebsbereichen)

ROAT-2026-0336

Decree No. 2024-1063 of 25 November 2024 on automated road freight transport (Décret n° 2024-1063 relatif au transport routier automatisé de marchandises)

Cite this snapshot

ROAT Observatory, Post-type-approval deployment models [ROAT-MOD-SECOND-GATE], snapshot 2026-09-07 [ROAT-SNAP-SECOND-GATE-2026-09-07], DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22546848. Jozef Andraško. /modules/second-gate/2026-09-07/

Post-type-approval deployment models review snapshot

Coded rows

Germany – current law

France – current law

Croatia – current law

Great Britain – 2026 transitional current law

China – current transitional regime

Slovakia – current law (31 Aug 2026)

China – 2026 Road Traffic Safety Law draft prospective

Slovakia – CPT 1329 prospective model prospective

Since snapshot 2026-08-31

Provenance